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Abstract 
The paper argues that sunk costs’ sensitivity can lead to the optimal consumption-leisure choice 
under price dispersion. The increase in quantity to be purchased with the extension of the time 
horizon of the consumption-leisure choice equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal 
benefits. The implicit optimal choice results in the explicit satisficing decision. The 
transformation of cognitive mechanism of discouragement into satisficing happens only in the 
“common model” of consumer behavior. The paper argues that the cognitive mechanism of 
aspiration takes place when consumers try to get marginal savings on purchase greater than the 
wage rate and, therefore, they follow the “leisure model” of behavior where both the marginal 
utility of labor income and the marginal utility of consumption become negative. 
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Introduction 
The analysis of sunk costs usually have been followed by experimental studies, previewed by 
strong assumptions that “sunk cost effects on decision-making (were), of course, irrational from 
the perspective of both classical economic and normative decision theories.”(Garland and 
Newport 1991, p.55). However, there were some efforts to explain the phenomenon of sunk 
costs on the basis of economic rationality (McAfee et al. 2010).  
In 1980 R.Thaler attempted to point the way towards a positive theory of consumer choice on the 
basis of the prospect theory of D.Kahneman and A.Tversky (Thaler 1980). R.Thaler reviewed 
some issues that were considered inconsistent with economic theory. The analysis of that 
inconsistency included the endowment effect, the search for big-ticket items, and the sunk costs 
effect. This paper continues to argue that there are no inconsistencies and the standard tools of 
economic theory can explain all these effects that do require neither alternative descriptive 
theories nor specific utility functions. 
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It was previously shown that the development of the G.Stigler’s marginal approach could reveal 
the general relationship between labor, search or home production, and leisure (Aguiar and Hurst 
2007, Malakhov 2003).  Furthermore, that general relationship could retain a metaphorical 
methodological legacy of M.Friedman and L.J.Savage. Like billiards player, a consumer does 
not engage complicated calculations.  He just relies on his feelings and he takes a satisficing 
decision. And this satisficing decision automatically equalizes marginal costs of search with its 
marginal benefit (Malakhov 2012, 2013b), or:  
w ∂L
∂S
=Q ∂P
∂S
(1)  
 
w – wage rate; L – labor time; S – time of search; ∂L/∂S<0 - propensity to search; Q – quantity to be purchased; 
∂P/∂S<0 - price reduction in a given store.  
 
If we take this equation as the constraint, we can solve the consumption-leisure utility 
maximization problem ( Fig1.;Fig.2).  Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
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Fig.1. Explicit satisficing decision                                     Fig.2. Implicit optimal choice 
wL(S) – labor income; QP(S) – expenditures on the chosen quantity; wL0 – reservation labor income; QPs – 
expenditures at the starting price; QPp – actual expenditures; QP0 – potential labor income {QP0=w(L+S)=-
T∂P/∂S}; U(Q,H) – consumption-leisure utility for 24 hours; (Q0,H0) – optimal consumption-leisure choice. 
 
The general relationship between labor, search, and leisure shows that standard tools of the 
economic marginal analysis can easily explain the paradox of little pre-purchase search for big-
ticket items (Malakhov 2012). Moreover, the explanation of this paradox represents only a part 
of the synthesis of the search-satisficing concept with the neoclassical paradigm. This synthesis 
also discovers microeconomic roots of the endowment effect. Indeed, this effect occurs because 
 3 
there is a difference between the actual labor income wL, spent on purchase, and the potential 
labor income w(L+S), where search costs wS increase the willingness to accept (Fig.1)1. 
The billiard metaphor represents also a basis for the understanding how the search-satisficing 
procedure can incorporate the consumer sunk costs’ sensitivity. 
 
“Common” sunk costs’ sensitivity 
The C.Kogut’s study of consumer search behavior and sunk costs showed that individuals were 
making decisions based on the total return from searching, rather than simply the marginal return 
from another draw (Kogut 1990). The analysis of the search behavior can eliminate the 
difference between total and marginal estimates. Usually sunk costs are followed by a feeling of 
disappointment. If the problem is strictly constrained, this disappointment will expose the 
cognitive mechanism of discouragement. The discouragement is one of the mechanisms that 
result in goal termination (Simon 1967). However, the nature of the problem of sunk costs by 
definition needs a relaxation of constraints because “this effect is manifested in a greater 
tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.” 
(Arkes and Blumer 1985, p.124). From the point of view of the search theory the discouragement 
means that the search has not been efficient and total losses are greater than total gains. This 
consideration can be written as |dwL(S)|>|dQP(S)|. However, any relaxation needs a marginal 
evaluation. And hence we can turn from the total discouragement to the marginal disappointment 
(Fig.3; Eq.2) 2: Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
S
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dwL(S) > dQP(S) ;
w dS ∂L
∂S
>Q dS ∂P
∂S
; (2)
w ∂L
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>Q ∂P
∂S
 
Fig.3. Explicit suboptimal disappointing decision 
 
                                            
1 The analysis of the endowment effect needs a voluminous presentation of discussions on the WTP-WTA 
relationship. Readers, who are interesting in the development of the search model, can make this analysis 
themselves. Here it is only worth to pay attention to the point of departure, where the following Equation 4, taken 
for the value S=0, provides the equality WTP=WTA. 
2 Absolute values do not change the logic of the presentation and they are taken here only for the simplicity of 
exposition. 
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The inequality (2) states the fact that for the given price reduction ∂P/∂S, i.e., in the given store, 
the absolute value of marginal loss is greater than the absolute value of marginal benefit. We 
cannot rationalize our purchase of the chosen quantity in the chosen store. Simply, the price in 
this store for the chosen quantity might correspond more or less to the reservation price and it 
seems “insufficiently interesting”.  But it might be satisficing for the greater quantity. The 
greater quantity may be either explicit, and we buy more potatoes, or implicit, if we come back 
to the J.Stiglitz’s notation that “a good x which lasts twice as long as a good y (if the interest rate 
is zero) is just equal to two units of y” (Stiglitz 1979, p.342), and the “insufficiently interesting” 
price corresponds to a higher quality and to a longer product’s lifecycle.  
The J.Stiglitz’s notation shows the way where the phenomenon of sunk costs’ sensitivity 
appears. Consumers increase quantity to be purchased in order to recover fixed sunk costs of 
visiting the store. “The buyer’s sunk travel costs may be exploited…In this case, because the 
cost of the extra trip may not be worth it, the consumer may still buy other items from the 
retailer…” (Ratchword 2009, p.56). However, if we consider the consistent buyer who does not 
change his intensity of consumption, we have to follow the J.Stiglitz’s notation and we should 
agree that the increase in quantity changes the time horizon of the consumption-leisure choice. 
Consumers leave the maximum of the current consumption-leisure utility and they look for 
another maximum with the new time horizon. Again, this shift does not represent calculations of 
marginal values of search. The choice of another maximum represents the implicit process of the 
explicit way out from disappointment. 
However, the increase in quantity to be purchased changes the marginal values of search. The 
change in the absolute value of the marginal benefit is obvious: 
∂Q |∂P / ∂S |
∂Q
=
∂P
∂S
> 0 (3)  
The increase in quantity to be purchased raises the absolute value of the marginal benefit of 
search. However, the change in the value of marginal costs of search is not so evident. Here we 
should come back to the properties of the “common model” of search behavior (Malakhov 2012, 
2013a): 
 
w ∂L
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= −w L+ S
T
→w ∂L
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= w L+ S
T
(4)  
 
The increase in consumption gives us the following: 
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Then we can simplify the expression in parentheses, keeping in mind that being disappointed by 
the given price reduction, the consumer decides to buy goods not only for this week but also for 
the next week in order not to travel to the store next Saturday (∂S/∂Q=0):  
 
e(L+S ),Q =
∂(L+ S)
∂Q
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The decision to buy more changes neither the price and price reduction nor the intensity of 
consumption. Therefore, the increase in labor time as well as the increase in leisure time should 
be proportional to the increase in quantity to be purchased, or eL,Q =1 and eH,Q =1. However, it is 
easy to show that the proportional increase in labor time (eL,Q =1) as well as in leisure time (eH,Q 
=1) give us e(L+H),Q =1. And we have: 
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or the increase in consumption decreases the absolute value of marginal costs of search. This 
means that the increase in quantity to be purchased moves the marginal values of search in 
opposite directions ((3) and (8)) until the moment when disappointment vanishes and the 
inequality (2) takes the form of the key equation (1). And this equation means that the consumer 
maximizes the consumption-leisure utility on its new level for a new time horizon (Fig.4): 
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Fig.4. Explicit satisficing decision for the extended time horizon T(Q) 
 
“Leisure” sunk costs’ sensitivity 
The “common model” of behavior presumes that the absolute value of marginal savings on 
purchase is less than the wage rate  (w>Q|∂P/∂S;|). This inequality results in the common 
redistribution of time where search displaces both labor time and leisure time from the given 
time horizon, like ice displaces both whiskey and soda from the glass (L+S+H=T; 
∂L/∂S+1+∂H/∂S=0; -1<∂L/∂S<0; ∂H/∂S<0). However, when the absolute value of marginal 
savings becomes greater than the wage rate, the marginal utility of labor income becomes 
negative (MUw=λ<0) (Malakhov 2013a). Moreover, the inequality (w<Q|∂P/∂S;|) changes the 
redistribution of time. According to the key equation of the search model (1), the absolute value 
of the propensity to search becomes greater than one, |∂L/∂S|>1, or ∂L/∂S<-1. The “price of 
leisure” becomes greater than the wage rate. And whatever the time horizon we choose, we will 
always get the positive leisure-search relationship (∂H/∂S>0). However, the positive leisure-
search relationship results in the positive consumption-leisure relationship (∂H/∂S>0; ∂Q/∂H>0) 
(Malakhov 2011,2013a). And with regard to the negative marginal utility of labor income 
(MUw=λ<0) consumption becomes “bad”. The negative marginal utility of labor income makes 
the marginal utility of the absolute value of price reduction ∂U/∂|∂P/∂S| positive. If the prices’ 
search itself has the diminishing marginal efficiency (∂P/∂S<0; ∂2P/∂S2>0), the greater absolute 
value of price reduction |∂P/∂S| corresponds to the higher price. And the Veblen effect takes 
place (Fig.5): 
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Fig.5. Veblen effect and “leisure” sunk costs 
 
Here, the only way to compensate the high price is to increase leisure time in order to depreciate 
the purchase of the big-ticket item. If we substitute the search by the home production, we will 
get the same result.3 
The purchase of big-ticket items clarifies the behavioral difference between the “common 
model” and the “leisure model”.  In the “common model” consumers can choose the big-ticket 
item of higher quality and with guarantees. That makes it more expensive but the recalculation of 
the time horizon, i.e., of the big-ticket item’s lifecycle, as well as the recalculation and the 
subsequent increase in labor time keeps the consumption-leisure choice within the “common 
model”. The procedure described by the inequalities (3) and (8) makes the high price acceptable. 
And the explicit form of this rational implicit decision really looks satisficing, like it was well 
presented by Kapteyn et al. in 1979. 
The foundation of the “common model” is very strong because it is based on the natural rule of 
the redistribution of time.  When the share of leisure in the time horizon H/T determines leisure-
search relationship (dH(S)=dS×∂H/∂S=dS×(-H/T), and ∂H/∂S=-H/T), the propensity to search 
∂L/∂S can be determined by the very simple equation (4) and it gets the negative derivative, or 
∂2L/∂S2<0. This derivative of propensity to search provides the resolution of many 
microeconomic phenomena along the Cobb-Douglas consumption-leisure utility curve U(Q,H) = 
Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S in the same manner like physical laws provide correct intuition of billiards players.  
But it is not true for the “leisure model” of behavior. The Cobb-Douglas curve disappears. There 
is no natural equivalent to the redistribution of time under the positive leisure-search ∂H/∂S>0 
relationship. And we cannot determine exactly the depreciation rule for either high price or 
excess consumption under such extension of leisure time. Indeed, “once individuals have made a 
                                            
3 The analysis of “leisure model” with regard to the home production illustrates well the irrational shorten labor 
supply in agrarian economics, which expose the Chayanov’s backward bending effect (see, for example, Shanin 
1986). 
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large sunk investment, they have a tendency to invest more in an attempt to prevent their 
previous investment from being wasted. The greater the size of their sunk investment, the more 
they tend to invest further, even when the return on additional investment does not seem 
worthwhile.” (McAfee et al., pp.324). Once the Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1995 from Pauillac is 
bought for the party, it will need something like the Opus XA from Arturo Fuente in order to 
make cigars “well-matched” with the good wine. And the leisurely manner of consumption of 
good wine with good cigars definitely makes party longer. 
Conclusion 
It looks like a paradox that only for examples like Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1995 - Opus XA 
Arturo Fuente as well as for many other cases of the “leisure model” of behavior we can 
definitely talk about aspiration as the cognitive mechanism of the goal termination. The 
properties of the model of behavior of Economic Man seem not to be compatible with the 
“common model” of behavior. Either Economic Man can perfectly calculate his consumption-
leisure ratio and he can choose anytime the store where the price reduction corresponds to his 
intensity of consumption (∂P/∂S=∂P/∂S(Q); ∂P/∂S = ∂P/∂S(H)) and consumption and leisure 
become perfect complements, or he is a vulgar maximizer. Indeed, he does not need a calculator 
to compare the wage rate with savings on purchase. He simply tries to find an opportunity to get 
from the search more than from the labor (|dwL(S)|<|dQP(S)|; w<Q|∂P/S|), when he can be 
really insatiable. However, the purchase could be neither planned, nor expected and the table 
tennis, bought at sales, really becomes “bad” and it can take its right place in a month in the 
garage. 
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